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THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS:  
STATE LIABILITY UNDER BITS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ICSID SYSTEM 
 
William W. Burke-White* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the past two decades, the international investment law regime has expanded 
dramatically, particularly through an extraordinary increase in the number of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) that confer direct rights on transnational investors.1 With well 
over 2000 such treaties in force today, investors have considerable legal opportunities to 
recoup loses caused by host-state impairment of transnational investments. This global 
expansion of BITs has been accompanied by the development of the International Center 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a forum under the auspices of the 
World Bank that allows for direct investor-state arbitration, generally of claims arising 
out of alleged violations of BITs. Today, there are 143 states parties to the ICSID 
Convention and investors in those states can bring claims directly against host-states for 
damages. In the past few years, the ICSID caseload has also expanded, with over 120 
cases pending as of late 2007. Taken collectively, these two developments provide 
investors with unprecedented protections against host-state impairment of transnational 
investments. 
More than forty of the cases presently pending before ICSID have been brought 
against the Republic of Argentina and assert that the Argentine government’s response to 
the catastrophic financial crisis that hit that country in late 2001 and 2002 impaired 
investor rights secured under a number of Argentina’s BITs. These cases are of 
extraordinary importance, not just because of the immense financial liability to which 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Ph.D. (Cambridge, 2006); J.D. 
(Harvard, 2002), M.Phil. (Cambridge, 2000), B.A. (Harvard, 1998). While the author has served as an 
expert witness for the Government of Argentina in some of the cases noted herein, this work reflects his 
independent academic opinion and is not indicative of the policy of the Government of Argentina. The 
author can be reached at wburkewh@law.upenn.edu 
1 As the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  (UNCTAD) reported in a 2000 study, the 
“number of treaties quintupled during the decade [of the 1990s], rising from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 
1,857 at the end of the 1990s. United Nations Conference on International Trade and Development, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (2000), UN DOC UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2, at iii. 
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they expose Argentina, but also because, in response, Argentina has invoked a broad set 
of legal arguments about the rights of states to craft policy responses to extraordinary 
situations such as a massive financial collapse. Argentina has asserted two separate 
arguments that go to the heart of the sovereign prerogative of states to develop 
fundamental policies to address exceptional circumstances, one based on treaty law and 
one based on customary international law. Argentina’s treaty law argument invokes the 
non-precluded measures (NPM) provisions of Argentine BITs that exempt certain actions 
taken by states in response to extraordinary circumstances from the substantive 
protections of the treaties. Argentina’s customary international law argument has asserted 
that the doctrine of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of Argentina’s actions in 
response to the crisis. These arbitrations thus test the both the limits of state freedom of 
action and investor protections under the BIT regime in exceptional circumstances. 
The resulting jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals in four cases against Argentina 
decided by early 2008 is deeply problematic, due in part to poor legal reasoning and 
questionable treaty interpretation and, in part, to the contradictory holdings in the awards 
issued to date. In fact, three of the four Tribunals have held Argentina fully responsible 
for harms to investors notwithstanding the extreme financial crisis it faced, whereas the 
remaining Tribunal absolved Argentina of much of its responsibility for those acts. This 
article asserts that the tree ICSID Tribunals that have held Argentina liable failed to fully 
recognize the treaty-based exceptions provided for in the NPM clauses of Argentina BITs 
and have interpreted the customary law doctrine of necessity extremely narrowly–so 
narrowly as to make it essentially unavailable to any state. Particularly when taken in 
light of the Report of the Annulment Committee in the case of CMS v. Argentina which 
rejected the legal reasoning of the arbitral tribunal in that case but failed to overturn the 
substantive outcome of the Tribunal’s award, this problematic jurisprudence presents a 
serious challenge to the legitimacy of the BIT regime and the ICSID system more 
generally. While scholars have long noted a legitimacy deficit in investor-state arbitration 
and predicted a crisis in the system, the Argentine cases may well be precipitating that 
crisis both because these cases touch on the most fundamental policy choices of states 
and because, for the first time, an Annulment Committee appears to be catalyzing a 
rethinking of investor-state arbitration more generally through its own jurisprudence. 
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This article argues that the awards issued in the Argentine cases to date exhibit 
extremely poor legal analysis with substantive outcomes that do not reflect either the text 
of Argentina’s BITs nor the intent of the state parties to those BITs. Moreover, the article 
suggests that these awards have the potential to undermine the legitimacy and authority 
of BIT arbitrations before ICSID and that, as a result of the CMS Annulment Committee 
Report, some of the basic premises of investor state arbitration must be reconsidered.  
The article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief background to Argentina’s 
financial crisis and the cases pending against it. Part III analyzes Argentina’s legal 
arguments in these cases, particularly its invocation of NPM clauses in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT and the customary law defense of necessity. Part IV considers the 
contradictory approaches and decisions in the four ICSID awards decided in the 
Argentine cases as of early 2008. Part V analyzes the Annulment Committee Decision in 
CMS v. Argentina and suggests that the Committee may well have intended to prompt a 
legitimacy crisis in the ICSID system and a more fundamental rethinking of state liability 
under BITs. 
 
II. THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
 
 In the last weeks of 2001, Argentina experienced a financial collapse of catastrophic 
proportions.2 In one day alone, the Argentine peso lost 40% of its value.3 As the peso 
collapsed, a run on banks followed. According to The Economist, throughout the 
collapse, “income per person in dollar terms…shrunk from around $7,000 to just $3,500” 
and “unemployment [rose] to perhaps 25%.”4 This economic chaos meant that, by late 
2002, over half the Argentine population was living below the poverty line.5 The crisis 
                                                 
2 See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, THE IMF AND THE 
BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1–2 (2005). For a discussion of the economic background to the collapse, 
see Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel & Martin Rapetti, The Argentinean Debt: History, Default and 
Restructuring 2–18 (Apr. 2005, revised Aug. 2005) (unpublished CEDES working paper), available at 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ ipd/pub/Frenkel_SDR_Eng.pdf. 
3 See Certificate Concerning the State of Necessity in Argentina, Guillermo Nielsen, Secretary of Finance 
of Argentina, Jan. 2003, ¶ 11 [hereinafter Nielsen Declaration] (on file with author).  Certification was 
made by the Argentine government to the courts adjudicating the debt cases and the ICSID cases arising 
out of the economic crisis. 
4 Argentina’s Collapse: A Decline Without Parallel, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2–8, 2002, at 26, 26. 
5 Nielsen Declaration, supra note 3, ¶ 5; see also Slump Turns Jobless Argentines Into Scavengers, N.Y. 
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soon spread from the economic to the political sphere. In December 2001, one day of 
riots left 30 civilians dead and led to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rua and 
the collapse of the government. A “tragicomic spectacle of a succession of five presidents 
taking office over a mere ten days” followed.6 
In response to the crisis, which has been likened to the Great Depression of the 1930s 
in the United States,7 Argentina adopted a number of measures to stabilize the economy 
and restore political confidence. Among these efforts was a significant devaluation of the 
peso through the termination of the currency board which had pegged the peso to the U.S. 
dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations,8 and the effective freezing of all bank 
accounts through a series of measures known collectively as the Corralito.9  
Though these measures offered a long-term prospect of restored economic confidence 
and stability, they also imposed immediate and painful costs on all participants in the 
Argentine economy, including foreign investors. While Argentine citizens had little legal 
recourse, many foreign investors who were harmed by Argentina’s response to the crisis 
sought legal protection under the regime of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which 
Argentina had entered into during the 1980s and 1990s.10 Such treaties offered investors 
guarantees including the internationalization of contractual breaches, national treatment, 
and most-favored nation protections.11 In addition, these treaties often provided investors 
the possibility of direct investor-state arbitration before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).12 
                                                                                                                                                 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at § 1, at 14.  Beginning in late November 2000, massive strikes swept Argentina. 
On November 23, 2000, “[m]illions of workers stayed off their jobs in the largest national strike in years as 
a union–led protest against government austerity measures virtually paralyzed the country.” Argentina: 
Strikes Against Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at A6. 
6 BLUSTEIN, supra note 2, at 1. 
7 See, e.g., A Survey of Capitalism and Democracy: Liberty’s Great Advance, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, 
at 4, 6 (“Argentina has endured an economic collapse to match the Great Depression of the 1930s….”). 
8 See Law No. 25561, Jan. 7, 2002, 29810 B.O. 1, available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=71477. 
9 See Decree No. 1570, Dec. 3, 2001, 29787 B.O. 1, available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=70355. For reference to the measures as the 
Corralito, see, for example, CARINA LOPEZ, STANDARD & POOR’S, THE ARGENTINE CRISIS: A 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFTER THE SOVEREIGN DEFAULT (Apr. 12, 2002),  
http://www.standardandpoors.com/europe/francais/Fr_news/Argentine-Chronology-of-Events_12-04-
02.html. 
10 For a list of Argentine BITs, see U.N. Conference on Int’l Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 1959–1999, at 26–27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000) (prepared by 
Abraham Negash), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. 
11 For a discussion of protections often found in BITs, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233–58 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Book Note, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 612, 613–14 (1995). 
12 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has been created under the 
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For investors harmed by Argentina’s response to the economic crisis, the possibility of 
direct arbitration against the Argentine government for breaches of BITs offered a 
potentially promising means to recoup losses suffered during the crisis. Claims framed as 
a violation of a BIT could be brought directly against Argentina through ICSID. Only 
limited means are available to challenge ICSID awards and such awards are generally 
perceived as enforceable in national courts. Not surprisingly, then, Argentina has become 
subject to no fewer than forty-three ICSID arbitrations brought by investors who assert 
that Argentina’s response to the crisis harmed investments protected by various BITs.13 
Argentina’s potential liability from these cases alone could be greater than U.S. $8 
billion, more than the entire financial reserves of the Argentine government in 2002.14 
Some have speculated that the total value of potential claims against Argentina could 
reach U.S. $80 billion.15 
III. ARGENTINA’S LEGAL ARGUMENTS FOR POLICY FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE 
TO AN ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
In response to this onslaught of ICSID arbitrations, Argentina has, not surprisingly, 
denied that its actions in fact caused the harms asserted by investors.16 Argentina’s legal 
approach has also gone considerably further, asserting two broad arguments which raise 
deeper structural questions about the rights of states to respond to extraordinary situations 
such as a massive financial crisis. Specifically, Argentina has invoked the NPM clauses 
of its BITs and has asserted that the state of necessity in customary international law 
precludes the wrongfulness of its actions. These arguments suggest, first, as a matter of 
treaty law and, second, as a matter of customary law, that states in circumstances such as 
                                                                                                                                                 
auspices of the World Bank to hear such cases. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm.  
13 For a listing of concluded and pending cases before ICSID, see The World Bank Group, International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Cases, 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
14 Gabriel Bottini, Counsel, Office of the Attorney Gen., Republic of Arg., Issues of Jurisdiction and 
Merits Arising from the Argentine Litigation at ICSID, Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of International Economic Law Symposium: International Investment and Transnational Litigation: 
Challenges of Growing and Expanding Investor State Disputes (Feb. 2, 2007). 
15 Wailin Wong, Argentina Treasury Attorney: World Bank Claims Could Reach $80 Billion, DOW JONES 
INT’L NEWS, Jan. 21. 2005. 
16 See LG&E v. Argentina Republic, Respondent’s Memorial on the Merits. 
 6
that which Argentina faced in 2001 and 2002 have a legal right to take actions that could 
harm investors and that would in ordinary circumstances violate BIT obligations. In an 
ever more globalized world in which exceptional circumstances such as financial crises, 
terrorist threats, and public health emergencies—are all too common, the ability of states 
to craft viable policy responses becomes ever more critical. In that context, the Argentine 
ICSID cases test the extent of state freedom to craft critical policy choices and the reach 
of investor protection under BITs and customary law in the face of exceptional, but far 
from uncommon, emergencies.  
Argentina’s first legal response has been to invoke a long-dormant treaty clause in the 
BITs under which investors brought their claims against Argentina and that appeared 
perfectly tailored to deal with just such a situation.17 Argentina’s BITs with the United 
States, Germany, and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) each contain a 
non-precluded measures (NPM) provision that limits the applicability of investor 
protections under the BIT in exceptional circumstances. These NPM clauses allow states 
to take actions otherwise inconsistent with the treaty when, for example, the actions are 
necessary for the protection of essential security, the maintenance of public order, or to 
respond to a public health emergency.18 NPM provisions effectively “permit host-state 
impairment of covered investment” and, in turn, weaken the BIT “as an instrument for 
regulating host-state governments.”19 As long as the host-state’s actions are taken in 
pursuit of one of the permissible objectives specified in the NPM clause, acts otherwise 
prohibited by the treaty do not constitute breaches of the treaty and states should face no 
liability under the BIT. The lawyers in Argentina’s Procuración del Tesoro de la Nación 
have argued that the economic collapse of 2001–2002 triggered the NPM clauses of 
many of its BITs and thereby relieved the state of liability and any duty to compensate 
investors.20  
A few examples of NPM clauses offer an overview of their form and legal implications 
for state freedom of action in response to extraordinary crises such as the Argentine 
                                                 
17 See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 332-55 
(May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf. 
18 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.–Arg., 
art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT]. 
19 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 INT’L TAX & 
BUS. LAW. 159, 170 (1993). 
20 For one such clause, see, for example, U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, art. XI. 
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financial collapse. The first U.S. BIT, signed with Panama in 1982, stipulates in Article X 
that “[t]his treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of any and all 
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations 
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or the 
protection of its own essential security interests.”21 Over the years, the United States has 
developed new versions of its Model BIT and, hence, variations in the form and structure 
of the NPM clause have appeared over time. One of the more notable modifications 
occurred in the late 1990s when the United States clarified its position on the self-judging 
nature of the NPM clauses in its BITs by including explicit language to that effect, now 
stating that a party was not precluded from taking any measures that “it considers 
necessary” for the protection of the stated permissible objectives. The NPM clause in the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, drafted before this clarification of the self-judging nature of the 
treaty, provides: “[t]his treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of any and 
all measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its 
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and 
security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”22 
NPM clauses, such as that found in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, contain three basic 
elements. First, they provide for a nexus requirement. NPM clauses require that measures 
taken by a state that would otherwise deviate from a treaty obligation must be sufficiently 
related to the permissible objectives specified in the clause. This relationship is termed 
the “nexus requirement.” One widely used phrasing of the nexus requirement found, for 
example, in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, requires that for measures to be covered by the 
clause they have to be “necessary” for the attainment of one of the specified permissible 
objectives.23 Second, NPM clauses specify their scope of applicability, in that they either 
apply to an entire BIT or can be written in a more limited form so that they apply only to 
a subset of the treaty’s substantive provisions. The NPM clauses in U.S. BITs provide 
                                                 
21 Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Pan., art. X(1), Oct. 27, 1982, 21 
I.L.M. 1227 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama BIT]. A subsequent protocol amending the dispute settlement 
provisions of the original treaty was signed on June 1, 2000; see Protocol Amending Investment Treaty 
with Panama, U.S.-Pan., June 1, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. 106-46 (2000), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_panama_2000.pdf. 
22 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 18, art. XI.. 
23 The NPM clauses in the U.S. BITs consistently use the “necessary for” wording. See, e.g., Treaty 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Mozam., art. XIV, Dec. 1, 
1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–31 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Mozambique BIT].  
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that “[t]his Treaty shall not preclude”24 the application of the subsequently specified 
measures. As a result, the successful invocation of the NPM clause precludes the 
existence of a violation with respect to any and all substantive treaty provisions. In 
contrast, NPM clauses of a more limited scope, such as those found in German BITs, 
apply only to certain substantive clauses of the BIT, for example the guarantee of no 
“treatment less favourable.” Finally, NPM clauses establish a list of permissible 
objectives, toward which a state’s actions must be directed if they are to be covered by 
the exception provided for by the NPM clause. Permissible objectives in BIT NPM 
clauses include security, international peace and security, public order, public health, and 
public morality, among others. The U.S.-Argentina BIT, for example, specifies three 
permissible objectives: essential security, public order, and international peace and 
security. 
Despite the fact that NPM clauses are, in fact, relatively widespread in BIT agreements 
and occur in most, if not all, BITs of the U.S., Germany, India, Canada and the Belgian-
Luxembourg Union, the Argentine cases present the first test of such cases in investor-
state arbitration.25 In each of the cases arising under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, Argentina 
has argued that its actions in response to the financial crisis of 2001-2002 were justified 
as measures necessary to protect essential security and public order and that, because 
those actions fell within the provisions of the NPM clause, they did not violate the 
substantive protections accorded investors under the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As a result, 
Argentina has claimed that no internationally wrongful acts were committed and no state 
liability should attach.  
In arguing that the NPM clause of the U.S.-Argentina BIT precludes Argentina’s 
liability under the treaty, Argentina has asserted that the NPM clause should be 
interpreted as self-judging. Although the U.S.-Argentina BIT did not include expressly 
self-judging terms such as which it considers necessary, found in later U.S.-BITs, 
Argentina has relied on a mutual understanding of the term evidenced in the treaty’s 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 21 (emphasis added); U.S.-Mozambique BIT, supra note 23 
(emphasis added). 
25 Similar clauses can also be fond in a number of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties and have 
been considered in two cases before the International Court of Justice. See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 15 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua 
Judgment (Merits)]; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 811 
(Dec. 12). 
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context and travaux preparatoires from a consistent U.S. practice that such NPM clauses 
are understood as self-judging.26 In the alternative, Argentina has asserted that, even if 
the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not found to be self-judging, the terms of 
the clause were satisfied by the situation in Argentina in late 2001 and 2002. 
 In addition to the treaty-based defense provided by the NPM clauses in its BITs, 
Argentina has also invoked the doctrine of necessity in customary international law to 
preclude liability for harms to investors. The customary defense of necessity provides 
that a state may not be liable for actions taken to “safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril.”27 According to the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft 
Articles): 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State unless the act:  (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential 
interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an 
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of 
the international community as a whole. 2. In any case, necessity may not be 
invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:  (a) The 
international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; 
or (b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.28  
 
 A successful invocation of the necessity defense precludes the wrongfulness of a 
state’s actions and thereby allows the state to possibly avoid both responsibility and 
liability. As the Draft Articles explain, the defense of necessity is a secondary rule of 
customary international law that governs “the circumstances in which the wrongfulness 
of conduct under international law may be precluded.”29 Argentina has argued that the 
financial crisis of 2001 and 2002 impaired the country’s essential interests and that the 
                                                 
26 For a more detailed discussion of the self-judging nature of U.S. BITs, see William W. Burke-White & 
Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of 
Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (2008). 
27  See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
with Commentaries, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft Articles], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. (“Necessity may not be 
invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest 
of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”). 
See also Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25). 
28See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 27, art. 24(14). 
29See Id.  
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various legislative measures Argentina took in response thereto where the only available 
response to that crisis. As a result, Argentina has asserted that the criteria for customary 
law defense of necessity were met, precluding the wrongfulness of its actions 
independently from its argument with respect to the treaty-based NPM exception. 
Argentina’s plea of necessity under customary law represents the first modern 
necessity claim in investor-state arbitration. While the International Court of Justice 
recognized the validity of the necessity defense in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Projects 
Case, the Court found the defense inapplicable in the case as Hungary was deemed to 
have other means available to address the environmental threats to its essential interests.30 
In its submissions to ICSID, Argentina has also relied on a number of earlier cases before 
arbitral tribunals and the Permanent Court of International Justice, in which necessity was 
claimed on the basis of a state’s financial problems and in which tribunals applied a more 
lenient standard than did the ICJ in Gabcikovo, including Société Commerciale de 
Belgique31 and the Serbian Loans Case.32  
The four arbitrations against Argentina decided thus far and the remaining claims still 
pending provide a critical test of both the interpretation and applicability of NPM clauses 
and the availability of the customary law defense of necessity in response to a major 
economic crisis. In so doing, these cases test the flexibility available to states to craft 
policy responses to emergencies and the scope of investor protections in such 
circumstances. 
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICSID TRIBUNALS 
 
The four awards handed down in the Argentine cases as of early 2008 consider both 
the NPM exception and the necessity defense advanced by Argentina and reach 
                                                 
30 See Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at  40, 42. The Court noted “that, even supposing, as 
Hungary maintained, that the construction and operation of the dam would have created serious risks, 
Hungary had means available to it, other than the suspension and abandonment of the works, of responding 
to that situation. It could for example have proceeded regularly to discharge gravel into the river 
downstream of the dam.” Id. at 42. 
31 Société Commerciale de Belgique, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 160; Secretariat Survey, ¶. 288. 
32 Case Concerning Certain Serbian Loans, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 20; Secretariat Survey, ¶s. 263-
268. See also International Law Commission, Commentaries on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, at Art 25, p. 141, fn. 410. 
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contradictory and, at times, legally questionable conclusions.33 Whereas the Tribunals in 
the cases of CMS v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and Sempra v. Argentina found both 
the NPM clause and the necessity defense inapplicable, the Tribunal in LG&E v. 
Argentina found the NPM clause properly invoked and the necessity defense potentially 
applicable to Argentina.34  
Significantly, however, both the jurisprudence and legal reasoning of these ICSID 
Tribunals is often problematic. Not only do these Tribunals essentially ignore the treaty-
based NPM exception and restrict the necessity defense, the findings of at least three of 
the Tribunals appear to overlook the basic bargain between investor protection and state 
freedom of action inherent in a BIT and, thereby, limit the state’s ability to respond to 
exceptional situations, such as financial crises, in ways that that may threaten the long-
term willingness of states to participate in investor-state arbitration and, perhaps, the 
legitimacy of that system itself. 
 
1. The ICSID Tribunals and Non-Precluded Measures Provisions 
 
While the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentina cases reach different 
substantive outcomes and their decisions take distinct approaches to the function of NPM 
clauses, they agree on at least two critical points. First, the Tribunals interpret the 
essential security and public order provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT broadly enough 
to encompass economic emergencies, such as the financial crisis that enveloped 
Argentina in late 2001 and 2002.  
                                                 
33 The four cases decided to date are: CMS, supra note 17; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), ¶¶ 226, 266 [hereinafter LG&E Decision 
on Liability], available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_Liability_e.pdf., ¶ 212; 
Enron Award, supra note 35, ¶ 337.; 33. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Asset, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. Arb/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award], available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf at ¶ 373; and Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, ¶ 391  (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award], 
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Sempra_Energy-Award.pdf, at ¶ 388. The CMS 
case is presently subject to annulment proceedings. The arbitral panel in the CMS case consisted of 
Francisco Orrego Vicuna (President), Marc Lalonde and Francisco Rezek. The LG&E panel consisted of 
Tatiana de Maekelt (President), Francisco Rezek, and Albert Jan van den Berg. The Enron panel consisted 
of Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Albert Jan van den Berg and Pierre Yves Tschanz.  
34 See Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶¶ 226–66 (“Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and accordingly, 
the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host State….”); CMS Award, 
supra note 17, ¶ 387. The divergent decisions raise the problem of an arbitral system without meaningful 
appellate authority and no means of resolving different outcomes based on nearly identical facts.  
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A second area of agreement between the Tribunals is their interpretation of the NPM 
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as not self-judging.35 While the language of the NPM 
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not explicitly self-judging, Argentina has argued that 
it should be interpreted as self-judging, again based on long-standing practice of the 
United States. The Tribunals unanimously reject this claim and, therefore, apply a 
substantive review to Argentina’s invocation of the clause rather than a less strict good 
faith test.36  
Yet, the Tribunals justify this common approach to the NPM clause as non-self-
judging on very different grounds. For the CMS Tribunal, the non-self-judging character 
of the U.S.-Argentina NPM clause is based on a textual comparison of the NPM clause in 
the treaty with other instruments, such as GATT, that are explicitly self-judging and the 
ICJ’s treatment of similar language in the Nicaragua case.37 In contrast, the 
determinations by the LG&E Tribunal and the Enron Tribunal are, in part, based on 
supposed consideration of the parties’ understandings at the time the treaty was 
concluded. In the words of the LG&E Tribunal: “[b]ased on the evidence before the 
Tribunal regarding the understanding of the Parties in 1991 at the time the Treaty was 
signed, the Tribunal decides and concludes that the provision is not self-judging.”38 In 
reaching this conclusion, the LG&E Tribunal recognizes that the “language of the BIT 
does not specify who should decide what constitutes essential security measures–either 
Argentina itself, subject to a review under a good faith standard, or the Tribunal,” and 
looks to both the background materials and broader context of the treaty negotiations.39 
Despite the four Tribunals’ agreement on the non-self-judging nature of the NPM clause, 
only the Sempra Tribunal gives serious consideration to the weighty evidence of the 
common intent of the United States and Argentina that the clause should be self-
                                                 
35Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 373; Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 388, 391.  
36 The author has argued elsewhere that, due to the extensive US practice interpreting NPM clauses as self-
judging, the clause contained in the U.S.-Argentina BIT should be interpreted as self-judging and subject 
only to good faith review by an arbitral tribunal and not a full substantive review of the state’s policies. See 
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 26.  
37 CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 371. 
38 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 226, 266; Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 337. 
39 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 212. For example, the tribunal considers when the U.S. 
policy with respect to self–judging NPM clauses became explicit and finds that did not occur until 1992, 
after the U.S.-Argentina BIT was signed. Id. ¶ 213. Despite the agreement of the two tribunals that the 
NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self–judging, there is reason to question both tribunals’ 
decisions. As noted above, prior to the conclusion of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the United States had 
asserted a self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause in its BITs. 
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judging.40 Yet, even the Sempra Tribunal, notably composed of two arbitrators who also 
served in the CMS case, dismisses the relevance of that evidence and also concludes that 
the NPM clause is non-self-judging.41 
Despite agreement on the applicability of the NPM clause to economic emergencies 
and its non-self-judging nature, the four awards differ on a number of significant issues. 
A first key difference among the decisions is their approach to the relationship between 
the NPM clause in the treaty and the customary law defense of necessity.42 The CMS 
Tribunal, the Enron Tribunal, and the Sempra Tribunal effectively read the requirements 
of the customary international law defense of necessity into the NPM clause of the treaty, 
testing Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause against the basic requirements of the 
necessity defense in customary international law.43 The Enron Tribunal observes: 
“because there is no specific guidance” as to the interpretation of the NPM clause “under 
the treaty…[it is] necessary to rely on the requirements of the state of necessity under 
customary law.”44 Likewise, the CMS Tribunal begins its analysis of Article XI with 
explicit reference to “Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility” which addresses 
the necessity defense in customary law and asks whether “the plea of necessity 
would…be precluded.”45 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal considers Article XI of the BIT 
and the state of necessity in customary international law independently and does not 
impose the requirements of customary international law on Argentina’s invocation of the 
treaty-based NPM clause. The LG&E Tribunal notes: 
The concept of excusing a State for the responsibility for violation of its 
international obligations during what is called a “state of necessity” or “state of 
emergency” also exists in international law. While the Tribunal considers that the 
protections afforded by Article XI have been triggered in this case, and are 
                                                 
40 See Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 337; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 212; CMS 
Award, supra note 17, ¶ 371. 
41 See Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 382–88. 
42 For a discussion of the treatment of the state of necessity in the two cases, see August Reinisch, 
Necessity in International Arbitration—An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? 
Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 3 TRANSNATI’L DISP. MGMT. (2006); Stephan 
W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises, 24 J. 
INT’L ARB. 265, 277–84 (2007). 
43 CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 357 (asking if, “in the context of Article 25 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility [the necessity defense], the act in question does not seriously impair an essential interest of 
the State or States towards which the obligation exists”); see also Sempra Award, supra note 33, ¶ 376 
(“The Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law standard.”). 
44 Enron Award, supra note 33, ¶ 333. 
45 CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶¶ 353, 358. The CMS tribunal did analyze Article XI of the treaty 
independently of the customary defense of necessity, but read the customary law standards for invoking 
necessity back into its analysis of the NPM clause. Id. ¶¶ 353–358. 
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sufficient to excuse Argentina’s liability, the Tribunal recognizes that satisfaction 
of the state of necessity standard as it exists in international law (reflected in 
Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility) supports the 
Tribunal’s conclusion.46 
 
Although the fact that the requirements of the customary defense of necessity have 
been satisfied may support the LG&E Tribunal’s findings, the successful invocation of 
the NPM clause ought to be based on a separate test and distinct evidence, independent 
from the customary defense of necessity itself. For the LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause 
is a separate risk allocation device and an explicit part of the bargain in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, providing the states parties greater protections than would have been 
available in customary law. For the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals, in contrast, the 
NPM clause appears to be merely a textual restatement of the pre-existing customary 
defense of necessity that has no independent legal impact. 
As both a legal and policy matter, the approach taken by the LG&E Tribunal is far 
more appropriate. Legally, reading the customary defense of necessity into the NPM 
clause both violates the Vienna Convention rule of lex specialis and the canonical rule 
that each treaty provision must be given effect. As a matter of policy, the incorporation of 
the necessity defense into the NPM clause fails to recognize the actual understanding of 
the U.S. and Argentina, whereby, in exchange for granting investors greater protections 
than would have been available in customary law, the states also sought to preserve for 
themselves greater freedom of action through the NPM clause than would have been 
available in customary international law.  
A second area of significant disagreement among the four Tribunals is the level of 
deference they accord to Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause. While all the 
Tribunals agree the clause is not self-judging, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals 
apply a far more rigorous standard to the nexus requirement under the NPM clause, 
importing the customary law requirements of necessity and requiring Argentina to show 
that the actions it took were the only ones available to the government to respond to the 
crisis. Although the Sempra Tribunal recognizes that “it is not the task of the tribunal to 
substitute its view for the government’s choices,” its interpretation of the “only available 
means” requirement essentially removes all policy responses from the NPM clause 
                                                 
46 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 245. 
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exception simply by finding that there were more than one possible response to the 
crisis.47 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal takes an approach somewhat closer to the margin 
of appreciation doctrine in European human rights law, according to which an 
international tribunal will give discretion to the state itself to craft its policies within a 
margin of international supervision. The LG&E Tribunal suggests, for example, that were 
it “to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s determination would be 
subject to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ from the 
substantive analysis presented here.”48 In essence, then, the LG&E Tribunal reduces the 
level of scrutiny of Argentina’s invocation of Article XI down to something close to a 
good faith review and appears to afford Argentina a margin of appreciation in which to 
make its own determinations of the appropriate responses to the crisis. For example, the 
LG&E Tribunal found: 
Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called for immediate, 
decisive action to restore civil order and stop the economic decline.…Article XI 
refers to situations in which a State has no choice but to act. A State may have 
several responses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its essential 
security interests.49  
The LG&E approach recognizes the subjective nature of certain permissible objectives 
under the BIT and finds that states, rather than ICSID Tribunals, are often in the best 
position to craft appropriate policy responses to emergency situations. 
A third area of substantive disagreement among the Tribunals is the question of 
compensation. While the CMS Tribunal did not find either the requirements of necessity 
in customary international law or the standards of the NPM clause met, it suggested that 
neither provision would, even if applicable, excuse the state invoking the clause of 
liability and the duty to pay compensation.50 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal opined that 
“Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness 
of an act of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liability.”51 As a 
                                                 
47 Sempra Award, supra note 33, ¶¶ 350–51. This approach fails to give the government any policy 
flexibility and does not recognize that some policy options may be more or less effective in responding to 
the crisis. 
48 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 214. 
49 Id. ¶¶ 238–39. 
50 The CMS Tribunal observed, for example, that “the plea of state of necessity may preclude the 
wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to compensate the owner of the right which had 
been sacrificed.” Hence, “in the absence of agreement between the parties the duty of the tribunal in these 
cases is to determine the compensation due.” CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶¶ 388, 394. 
51 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, ¶ 261. 
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consequence, the LG&E Tribunal found that Argentina was not liable for damages to 
investors during the period of emergency.52 Given that the very purpose of the NPM 
clause was to guarantee states greater freedom of action in the face of extraordinary 
circumstances in exchange for enhanced protections for investors, the approach taken by 
the LG&E Tribunal appears to better reflect the bargain inherent in the NPM clause of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT. If such clauses were not intended to prevent liability, they would not 
in fact serve the purpose of guaranteeing greater freedom of action to states in cases of 
emergency as such states would remain liable notwithstanding the NPM clause. 
Despite the LG&E Tribunal’s more favorable stance toward Argentina, the awards in 
the CMS, Enron, and Sempra arbitrations severely limit the applicability of the NPM 
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. By requiring Argentina’s invocation of the NPM clause 
to meet the requirements of the necessity defense in customary international law and 
providing very little deference to Argentina’s policy choices in response to the financial 
crisis, the these three Tribunals make it extremely difficult for any state to invoke the 
NPM clause of a BIT instrument, thereby narrowing the state’s potential policy responses 
in a crisis situation and ensuring that, notwithstanding the inclusion of an NPM clause in 
the BIT, the state remains liable to investors for harms caused by policy responses to such 
a crisis.  
The jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals in the Argentina cases is particularly 
problematic for two reasons. First, the legal reasoning in these awards is often deeply 
flawed. Specifically, by conflating the NPM clause with the customary defense of 
necessity, the Tribunals violate the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation (ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat). As the WTO Appellate body found in the U.S.-Gasoline 
case, “[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna 
Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. 
An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or 
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.”53 Reading an NPM clause as equivalent 
                                                 
52 Id. ¶ 266 (“Based on the analysis of the state of necessity, the Tribunal concludes that, first, said state 
started on December 1, 2001 and ended on April 26, 2003; second, during that period Argentina is exempt 
of responsibility, and accordingly, the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by 
the host State.”). 
53 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline]. Similarly, Professor Fitzmaurice observes, “texts are to be presumed to have been intended to 
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to the customary defense of necessity would render the clause pointless because the 
customary defense of necessity would be available to states irrespective of the inclusion 
of the NPM clause in a BIT. In order to satisfy the principle of effectiveness in treaty 
interpretation, NPM clauses must be read as distinct rules that states create in their treaty 
relationships, independent of the necessity defense in customary international law, and 
establishing a separate grounds for precluding state liability.  
A second fundamental problem with the jurisprudence of the Tribunals in the 
Argentine cases is that it fails to do justice to the intent of the parties as expressed in the 
clear language of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. As the drafting history of the U.S-Argentina 
BIT indicates, the U.S. and Argentina included an NPM provision precisely because they 
sought to secure for themselves greater policy flexibility in response to exceptional 
circumstances than would have been ordinarily available under customary international 
law.54 By failing to recognize the scope of the NPM clause as intended by the parties and 
drafted into the BIT, the Tribunals foreclose the very policy options that the U.S. and 
Argentina sought to preserve for themselves in extreme situations and provide investors 
with greater protections than the states intended to confer on them. The result is not just 
poor law, but also a direct challenge to states parties to BIT instruments with NPM 
clauses that forces them to ask whether ICSID Tribunals will, in fact, interpret BITs in a 
balanced way that conforms to the intent of the drafters as memorialized in a BIT. To the 
degree that such tribunals overstep the intent of the states parties and the plain language 
of the BIT itself, they may well chill states from entering into further BIT instruments 
and subjecting themselves to ICSID jurisdiction. 
  
2. The ICSID Tribunals and The Customary Defense of Necessity 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have a definite force and effect, and should be interpreted so as to have such force and effect rather than so 
as not to have it and so as to have the fullest value and effect consistent with their wording.” G. G. 
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and 
Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1951); see also H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive 
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 48 
(1949). 
54 For a discussion of the drafting history of the NPM clause and the US BIT program more generally, see 
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 26.  
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In addition to asserting the exception to the substantive protections of the BIT provided 
for by the NPM clause, Argentina has also invoked the separate defense of necessity 
under customary international law in each of the ICSID arbitrations against it. Despite the 
fact that the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentine cases have 
improperly conflated the treaty-based NPM clause with the customary law defense of 
necessity, each Tribunal does offer an opinion on the applicability of the necessity 
defense to the Argentine financial crisis. Although the LG&E Tribunal found that the 
necessity defense might be available to Argentina, the CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals 
all held the necessity defense inapplicable and the wrongfulness of Argentina’s actions 
not precluded. All four Tribunals accept the ILC’s Draft Articles as the definitive 
interpretation of the necessity defense in customary law and apply the criteria specified in 
the Draft Articles to determine the applicability of the necessity defense. While the CMS, 
Enron and Sempra Tribunals suggest somewhat different standards for the invocation of 
necessity under customary law, all three offer such narrow interpretations of necessity so 
as to make the defense essentially unavailable to a state attempting to devise a policy 
response to a severe crisis or other emergency. 
 As an initial matter, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals find that the economic 
crisis, which befell Argentina, was not of a sufficient magnitude to threaten Argentina’s 
essential interests and, thereby, open the door to a necessity defense. The CMS Tribunal, 
for example, notes that: “The Tribunal is convinced that the crisis was indeed severe…. 
However, neither could it be held that wrongfulness should be precluded as a matter of 
course under the circumstances.”55 Similarly, while acknowledging that Argentina faced 
a severe crisis, the Enron Tribunal opines that “the argument that such a situation 
compromised the very existence of the State and its independence so as to qualify as 
involving an essential interest of the State is not convincing.”56 In contrast, the LG&E 
Tribunal found that the financial crisis in Argentina was sufficient to imperil an essential 
interest and, thereby, open the door to the necessity defense: “As evidence demonstrates, 
economic, financial or those interests related to the protection of the State against any 
danger seriously compromising its internal or external situation, are also considered 
                                                 
55 CMS Award, supra note 17, ¶ 320. 
56 Enron Award, supra note 33, at  ¶306. 
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essential interests.”57  
 A second issue considered by all four Tribunals arises from article 25(1)(a) of the 
Draft Articles, according to which the defense of necessity is only available if the actions 
taken by the state were “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril.”58 As the ILC Commentaries to the Draft Articles 
provide: “The plea is excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means available, even 
if they may be more costly or less convenient.”59 The key question facing the four 
Tribunals in this regard was how to interpret the no other available means requirement. 
Would it be sufficient to invalidate the plea of necessity if, for example, there were some 
other policy choice open to Argentina or would it have to be shown that there was an 
equally effective policy response open to Argentina that would not have breached the 
substantive protections of the BIT? At its core, that is a question of how much deference 
to give the Argentine government’s determination that its policy choice was the only or 
best available response to the crisis. 
 Again, the CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals offer extremely narrow interpretations 
of the necessity defense, essentially second-guessing Argentina’s policy choices and 
suggesting that, because some other means was available to Argentina to respond to the 
crisis, the necessity defense was legally unavailable. The CMS Tribunal, for example, 
finds that the ILC’s comment “that the plea of necessity is ‘excluded if there are other 
(otherwise lawful) means available, even if they may be more costly or less convenient,’ 
is persuasive in assisting this Tribunal in concluding that the measures adopted were not 
the only steps available.”60 Similarly, the Enron Tribunal notes: “A rather sad world 
comparative experience in the handling of economic crises, shows that there are always 
many approaches to address and correct such critical events, and it is difficult to justify 
that none of them were available in the Argentine case.”61 The CMS, Enron and Sempra 
Tribunals all fail to suggest alternative courses of action Argentina could have followed62 
                                                 
57 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 251.  
58 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, supra note 28, at art. 25. 
59 ILC Commentaries, supra note 28, art. 25, pg 203, ¶16. 
60 CMS Award, supra note 17, at ¶ 324. 
61 Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶308. See also Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 350 (providing a 
word-for-word identical discussion as the CMS Tribunal). 
62 The Sempra Tribunal merely notes that “it is not the task of the Tribunal to substitute its view for the 
 20
or to consider the counterfactual argument of the results such alternative policies might 
have entailed for both the state and investors. The three Tribunals simply assert that if 
any alternative policy choice is available—regardless of its likely effectiveness—the 
necessity defense is unavailable. Since states always face a range of policy choices in 
response to any issue, whichever policy a state chooses is, by definition, not the only 
available response to the crisis. The three Tribunals thus give no deference whatsoever to 
Argentina’s policy choices and, essentially, vitiate the necessity defense as a matter of 
law. 
 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal gives considerable deference to Argentina’s own 
policy choices in response to the crisis, recognizing that an ad hoc arbitral tribunal is 
poorly positioned to second-guess the policies of the government. The LG&E Tribunal 
observes: “In this circumstance, an economic recovery package was the only means to 
respond to the crisis. Although there may have been a number of ways to draft the 
economic recovery plan, the evidence before the Tribunal demonstrates that an across-
the-board response was necessary, and the tariffs on public utilities had to be 
addressed.”63 The LG&E Tribunal does not ask if a slightly different recovery package 
could have been employed, but merely determines that some across-the-board recovery 
package was needed. It pays deference to Argentina’s determination that the specific 
policies adopted by the country were the most appropriate in the circumstances and finds 
that the criteria for invocation of the necessity defense in customary law were satisfied. 
This approach is far more appropriate in that it leaves open the necessity defense as long 
as some other clearly available and less restrictive policy alternative would not have 
provided an obviously adequate response to the crisis with less harm to the interests of 
investors. 
 The final issue with respect to the invocation of the necessity defense in customary 
law considered by all four Tribunals is whether Argentina contributed to the situation of 
necessity.64 The four Tribunals ask what level of contribution by a state to a crisis would 
be necessary to render the necessity defense inapplicable. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros 
                                                                                                                                                 
Government’s choice between economic options.  It is instead the Tribunal’s duty only to determine 
whether the choice made was the only one available, and this does not appear to have been the case.” 
Sempra Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 351.   
63 LGE Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 257. 
64 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 28, at 25. 
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Projects Case, for example, the ICJ found the plea of necessity inapplicable because 
Hungary had “helped, by act or omission to bring” into being the situation of necessity.65 
According to the ILC Commentaries, “the contribution to the situation of necessity must 
be sufficiently substantial and not merely incidental or peripheral.”66 
 The CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals all found that any contribution by Argentina 
whatsoever, including long range economic planning, was sufficient to invalidate the plea 
of necessity. In the words of the Enron Tribunal, “Although each party claims that the 
factors precipitating the crisis were either endogenous or exogenous, the truth seems to be 
somewhere in between with both kind of factors having intervened… his means that to an 
extent there has been a substantial contribution of the State to the situation of necessity 
and that it cannot be claimed that the burden falls entirely on exogenous factors.”67 
Similarly, the CMS Tribunal notes: “The crisis was not of the making of one particular 
administration and found its roots in the earlier crisis of the 1980s and evolving 
governmental policies of the 1990s that reached a zenith in 2002 and thereafter.  
Therefore, the Tribunal observes that government policies and their shortcomings 
significantly contributed to the crisis and the emergency and while exogenous factors did 
fuel additional difficulties, they do not exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in 
the matter.”68 As a result, these three Tribunals determined that the necessity defense was 
unavailable to Argentina because the state had contributed to the crisis.  
 Again, the LG&E Tribunal took a very different approach to the level of contribution 
necessary to exclude the plea of necessity, finding that even if Argentina had contributed 
to the underlying economic crisis, that contribution was neither significant nor 
intentional. In this respect, the LG&E Tribunal found that “in the first place, Claimants 
have not proved that Argentina has contributed to cause the severe crisis faced by the 
country; secondly, the attitude adopted by the Argentine Government has shown a desire 
to slow down by all the means available the severity of the crisis.”69 The LG&E Tribunal 
thus left the plea of necessity open to Argentina.  
 With respect to the applicability of the necessity defense, there is a clear split in the 
                                                 
65 I.C.J. Reports 1997i, p. 7, at p. 46, ¶ 57.  
66 ILC Commentaries, supra note 28, at art 25, ¶ 20. 
67 Enron Award, supra note 33, at ¶ 312. 
68 CMS Award, supra note 17, at ¶ 329. 
69 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 33, at ¶ 256. 
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jurisprudence of the ICSID Tribunals to date. While the CMS, Enron, and Sempra 
Tribunals significantly limit the availability of the necessity defense and find it 
unavailable to Argentina, the LG&E Tribunal offers a far more deferential analysis of the 
state’s invocation of necessity and finds the defense to apply in the case of the Argentine 
financial crisis. The approach taken by the majority of the tribunals thus far is, again, 
problematic because the analysis used by these three Tribunals essentially renders the 
necessity defense a legal nullity as a state will, almost without exception, have 
contributed at least in some indirect way to whatever emergency it may face and such a 
state will also, in almost every circumstance, have more than one possible policy 
response to such a situation. If this majority line of jurisprudence is followed, a state 
responding to a any crisis, with the possible exception of a truly unforeseeable natural 
disaster, despite the technical availability of the necessity defense, will be unable as a 
matter of law to successfully invoke the defense and liability will attach to whatever 
policy the state may chose to respond to the crisis.  Again, as with the Tribunals’ flawed 
interpretation of the NPM clause, the result may be to chill states’ willingness to enter 
into BIT obligations or to subject themselves to ICSID jurisdiction. 
 
V. THE CMS ANNULMENT COMMITTEE  REPORT AND THE VIABILITY OF ICSID 
ARBITRATION 
 
The opinions of the four Tribunals that have issued awards in the Argentina cases to 
date raise serious questions as to the legitimacy and viability of the ICSID system, 
particularly in cases such as these in which disputes implicate fundamental questions of 
state policy, such as the appropriate response to a financial crisis or other emergency. The 
legitimacy problem arises first from the contradictory holdings of the four Tribunals. The 
facts in each of the four cases are identical. In each case Argentina advanced the same 
argument—that the actions taken in response to the crisis were necessary to protect 
essential security interests and maintain public order under the NPM clause and that the 
criteria for the invocation of the necessity defense were met. Likewise, in each case 
Argentina presented very similar evidence and expert testimony. Yet, the Tribunals 
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reached opposite conclusions, based on different interpretations of the treaty’s NPM 
terms and different understandings of the necessity defense in customary international 
law.70 The fact that four Tribunals, when confronted with the same facts, evidence, and 
argumentation would reach very different interpretations of the law and diametrically 
opposite holdings is, itself, sufficient to call into question the legitimacy and viability of 
the ICSID arbitral system. 
The Argentine cases are, of course, not the first time that investor-state arbitrations 
have produced contradictory awards. The now infamous Lauder v. Czech Republic case, 
in which Lauder asserted breaches of BIT and contract rights based on the Czech 
Republic’s interference with media licenses, involved two separate arbitrations, one 
under the U.S.-Czech BIT brought by Lauder and one under the Netherlands-Czech BIT 
brought by a CME, a Dutch corporation.71 The two Tribunals in those cases also reached 
directly opposite conclusions with respect to whether a causal link existed between the 
Czech Republic’s actions and the harms done to Lauder. Those cases led to numerous 
calls in both the academic and practitioner communities for reforms to the investor-state 
arbitration system and, particularly, the creation of an appellate review system.72 Though 
no such reforms were undertaken in the wake of the Lauder cases, the recent Argentine 
awards raise once again the danger of inconsistent decisions and lack of appellate review 
in the ICSID system. 
A second question of legitimacy arising from the Argentine cases relates to the 
composition of the Tribunals and the precedential value of ICSID awards. While the three 
Argentine cases that narrow the applicability of the NPM clause and restrict the necessity 
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defense now appear to constitute a clear majority position and are being cited as 
precedent by other Tribunals, the structure of the ICSID system may well unduly weight 
the opinions of particular arbitrators who sit in a number of similar cases. In fact, the 
arbitral panels in the CMS, Enron, and Sempra cases had overlapping members. Professor 
Francisco Orrego Vicuna served as President of all three Tribunals and Marc Lalonde sat 
on both the Sempra and CMS panels. The CMS and Sempra awards not surprisingly 
contain verbatim legal analysis of numerous issues and the sole arbitrator in Sempra who 
had not also sat in CMS, Sandra Morelli Rico, offered a dissenting opinion that disagreed 
with many of the legal conclusions of the other two arbitrators. As Charles Brower has 
noted, when considering such cases, “the possibility dawns that selection of the tribunal - 
like jury selection - plays a role more dispositive and less unifying than the text of the 
treaty obligations.”73 
Of course, the desire for uniformity of jurisprudence might suggest that such 
overlapping panels is advantageous as it is more likely to lead to consistent outcomes. 
Yet, in a system such as ICSID that lacks appellate review authority, the repetition of 
particular arbitrators and, likely, their key holdings in numerous cases may confer greater 
legitimacy and precedential weight on particular lines of argument or legal conclusions.74 
When panels have the same president and, particularly, when they have a decisive 
majority of repeat members, the likelihood that they will analyze identical facts and legal 
analysis differently in a second case, declines markedly.75 What appears to occur instead 
is that the opinion of particular repeat player arbitrators in these cases is given additional 
weight as they decide nearly identical cases based on the same legal and factual analysis 
and thereby establish repeat, even if erroneous, precedents. Without appellate review, 
those repeat precedents gain perhaps undue weight and authority within the system. 
The third, and perhaps the most profound, question of legitimacy presented by the 
Argentine ICSID awards to date arises from the substantive decisions of three of the four 
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Tribunals with respect to both the NPM clause and the customary defense of necessity. 
This majority approach drastically limits the freedom of states to respond to emergency 
situations through both a narrow interpretation of the NPM clause and a highly restrictive 
reading of the necessity defense. By limiting, or even removing the possibility, of either 
of these exemptions from wrongfulness and liability, despite the manifest intent of the 
states parties to the BIT to include an NPM provision and maintain the customary defense 
of necessity, the Tribunals turn the U.S.-Argentine BIT into a far stronger instrument of 
investor protection than the states parties to the treaty likely intended. The failure to give 
effect to the clear language of the BIT and to do justice to the intent of the states parties 
as manifested in the treaty language is, not surprisingly, causing states to rethink their 
commitment to guarantee investor rights through BITs and allow direct investor-state 
arbitration before ICSID. After all, BITs represent an explicit bargain between the 
benefits of increased investment flows that follow from legalized investor protections and 
the need for states to preserve policy flexibility in ways that could impair investor 
interests. If ICSID Tribunals fail to recognize or accept the nature of that bargain 
underlying many BITs, states may be far less willing to accept direct investor-state 
arbitrations that appear to favor, or even expand, investor rights. 
These three legitimacy concerns alone have prompted leading scholars and 
practitioners to question the viability and legitimacy of investor-state arbitration. More 
significantly, they have led some states to withdraw from the ICSD system so as to 
minimize the potential for investor-state arbitrations based on their BIT obligations in a 
system which they perceive to lack legitimacy. In May 2007, for example, Bolivia 
notified the World Bank that it was withdrawing from the ICSID Convention and 
Bolivian President Evo Morales urged his Latin American counterparts to do the same.76 
Other states such as Venezuela and Ecuador have noted the desire to limit ICSID 
jurisdiction and minimize potential BIT liability.77 As states reconsider their commitment 
to ICSID in light of these legitimacy challenges, the viability of investor-state arbitration 
in its present form is called into question. 
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In many respects, the legitimacy challenges presented at least by inconsistent awards 
and overlapping tribunal membership are not new; scholars have noted the possibility of 
a legitimacy crisis in investor-state arbitration for a number of years. The Argentine cases 
do, however, provide reason to revisit these criticisms of the ICSID system, particularly 
in light of the narrowing of the necessity defense and the failure of the majority of the 
tribunals to give effect to the NPM provision of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.  
What does appear to be new in the Argentine cases, however, is an internal recognition 
within ICSID itself that the current form and operation of investor-state arbitration may 
be problematic. In response to the CMS award against Argentina, the Argentine 
Government filed a request for annulment pursuant to Rule 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
The September 25, 2007 decision of the Annulment Committee is a surprising and 
extraordinary piece of jurisprudence. The decision is so remarkable that it seems difficult 
to interpret it as anything but an attack on the ICSID system from within. The decision 
carries particular weight because of the membership of the Annulment Committee, which 
was composed of three of the most respected international lawyers presently practicing. 
Gilbert Guillaume is the President of the International Court of Justice; Nabil Elaraby is a 
member of that Court; James Crawford is Whewell Professor of International Law at 
Cambridge University and the Rapportuer of the International Law Commission on the 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention allows for annulment of arbitral awards only on 
the narrowest of grounds: “that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; that the 
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; that there was corruption on the part of a 
member of the Tribunal; that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule 
of procedure; or that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it was based.”78 
Notably the Convention does not provide for review of the legal determinations of the 
Tribunal, nor does it allow an annulment committee to overturn the award even on the 
most egregious errors of law. As the MINE Annulment Committee observed: “[A] 
Tribunal’s disregard of the agreed rules of law would constitute a derogation from the 
terms of reference within which the tribunal has been authorized to function… Disregard 
of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished form erroneous application of those 
                                                 
78 ICSID Convention, supra note 12, at  art. 52. 
 27
rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for annulment.”79 
Argentina, therefore, argued to the Annulment Committee that the CMS award failed to 
state the reasons on which its conclusions were based and that the failure to properly 
apply the NPM clause (Article XI) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT constituted a manifest 
excess of power.80 
The CMS Annulment Committee first considered Argentina’s claim that the Tribunal 
had failed to state the reasons on which its conclusion that CMS, the claimant, could 
enforce the obligations of Argentina to TGN, a subsidiary company. The Annulment 
Committee agreed with Argentina, finding that “in the end it is quite unclear how the 
Tribunal arrived at its conclusion that CMS could enforce the obligations of Argentina to 
TGN….In these circumstances there is a significant lacuna in the award, which makes it 
impossible for the reader to follow the reasoning on this point.”81 The Committee 
therefore annulled the decision of the Tribunal on this point. However, due to the 
severability of the various parts of the award, the Annulment Committee’s decision on 
this point did not impact the remainder of the award.  
A second issue addressed by the Committee was whether the Tribunal’s failure to give 
effect to Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT and its consideration of the customary law 
doctrine of necessity jointly with the NPM provision of the BIT involved a failure to state 
the reasons for the claim or constituted a manifest excess of power by the Tribunal. The 
Committee first found that, while the Tribunal’s logic was troubling, it had stated the 
reasons for its decision: “in the Committee’s view, although the motivation of the Award 
could certainly have been clearer, a careful reader can follow the implicit reasoning of the 
Tribunal.”82 The Committee then turned to the question of whether the failure to apply 
Article XI constituted a manifest excess of powers. First, the Committee observed that 
Article XI of the BIT and the customary defense of necessity are two separate and 
distinct legal standards: “The two texts having a different operation and content, it was 
necessary for the Tribunal to take a position on their relationship and decide whether they 
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were both applicable in the present case. The Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis, 
simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same footing. In doing so the 
Tribunal made another error of law.”83 Second, the Committee observed that the failure 
to apply Article XI constituted another error of law: “As admitted by CMS, the Tribunal 
gave an erroneous interpretation of Article XI. In fact, it did not examine whether the 
conditions laid down by Article XI were fulfilled and whether, as a consequence, the 
measures taken by Argentina were capable of constituting, even prima facie, a breach of 
the BIT.84 The Annulment Committee thus attacked the fundamental holding of the 
award, observing that “These two errors made by the Tribunal could have had a decisive 
impact on the operative part of the award.”85 
Despite finding clear legal errors in the CMS award that presumably impacted the 
ultimate outcome, the Annulment Committee proceeded to note its own limited powers of 
review and found that it lacked the jurisdiction to overturn the award. The Committee 
recalled:  
that it has only a limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In 
these circumstances, the Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the 
law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal. 
Notwithstanding the identified errors and lacunas in the Award, it is the case in 
the end that that Tribunal applied Article XI of the Treaty. Although applying it 
cryptically and defectively, it applied it. There is accordingly no manifest excess 
of powers.86 
 
 What makes this Annulment Committee report so unusual is that the Committee had 
no reason or need to find that the underlying CMS Award was flawed with outcome-
determinative errors. Doctrines of judicial minimalism would dictate that the Tribunal 
should have decided the issue on the narrowest possible grounds, in this case a simple 
finding that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the award on anything but a manifest 
excess of powers and that, lacking such a manifest excess, there was no need for further 
consideration of the CMS Tribunal’s legal conclusions.87 Yet, the Annulment Committee 
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engaged in an extensive substantive consideration of the Tribunal’s findings, stated in no 
uncertain terms that the Award was legally flawed, and suggested that those flaws were 
potentially outcome determinative. Careful, conservative, and deliberate international 
lawyers, such as the members of the CMS Annulment Committee, would not take such an 
approach without good reason. 
Two separate explanations of the Annulment Committee’s decision to reach beyond 
judicial minimalism and critique the substantive basis of the award seem most plausible. 
The first, quite simply, may have been an effort to prevent the CMS Award from having 
precedential weight. The Annulment Committee may have found the award and the fact 
that its analysis was quickly becoming the majority approach in the Argentine cases so 
legally troubling that it sought to vitiate the award of any precedential value and ensure 
that subsequent tribunals addressing similar issues did not follow the CMS Tribunal’s line 
of analysis.  
While the Committee may well have been attempting to deprive the CMS award of 
precedential weight, something more may have also been at stake. The Annulment 
Committee’s critique of the CMS Tribunal’s award was so blatant and at times even 
confrontational that the Committee may have been attempting to call into question the 
legitimacy of the CMS Tribunal and, more generally, a system that lacks appellate review 
to reverse gross and outcome determinative errors of law. As the Committee observed: 
“If the Committee was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award 
on this ground.”88 One can certainly read into the Annulment Committee’s decision a 
critical wake-up call to the ICSID system that poor jurisprudence and lack of appellate 
review authority are an unsustainable combination.  
Whether or not the Annulment Committee intended to throw the ICSID system into a 
crisis of legitimacy with the CMS Annulment Report is something we many never know. 
The early aftershocks of the CMS Annulment Decision, however, appear to be having 
just that effect. In the weeks after the Annulment Decision, senior officials in the 
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Argentine government have indicated a desire to reach an agreement with the U.S. 
publicly clarifying the self-judging nature of the NPM clause in the U.S-Argentine BIT 
and have made clear that it will be an extreme political challenge for Argentina to pay 
more than US$130 million from the national treasury based on award that has been found 
to be legally erroneous.89 At the very least, Argentina, like Bolivia, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, may be rethinking its commitment to investor-state arbitration and the ICSID 
system. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
While claims about the legitimacy and viability of investor-state arbitration and the 
ICSID system are long standing, the Argentine cases present significant new challenges 
for the system as a whole. By failing to apply the NPM provisions of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, the majority approach in these cases has eroded the flexibility states parties sought 
to preserve for themselves to respond to extraordinary situations and may have 
undermined the bargain between investor protection and state freedom of action that at 
least some states parties thought they had agreed to in their BITs. Similarly, by narrowing 
the customary defense of necessity to what is effectively a legal nullity, the Tribunals 
have further encroached on the only other means for states to avoid wrongfulness and 
liability for actions that harm investors taken in response to serious emergencies. To do 
so through inconsistent judgments and with reasoning deemed by an annulment 
committee to be legally erroneous is all the more problematic.  
If Argentina were to follow Bolivia’s lead and exit the ICSID system, investor-state 
arbitration would truly face a crisis of confidence. If states do not believe that investor-
state arbitration respects their rights, as well as those of investors, they will not consent to 
the system and that system itself will run the risk of collapse. Before that happens, a deep 
rethinking of the structure, purposes, and jurisprudence of investor-state arbitration is 
urgently needed. A variety of solutions have been suggested in the literature, ranging 
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from the creation of appellate review authority to the use of the margin of appreciation as 
a decision-making framework for the evaluation of state policies that fall within core 
domains. Now is the time for an urgent consideration of these and other proposals to 
restore both state and investor confidence in ICSID before it is too late. At the very least, 
the Argentine cases and the CMS Annulment Report must serve as a wake-up call to 
ICSID arbitrators to engage in more careful and deliberate legal reasoning that does 
justice both to the texts of the treaties they are interpreting and the intent of the states 
parties which drafted those texts. 
